

123171

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET CONTROL FORM

ATTENTION

Memo for NSC from
Acting Executive
Secretary on U.S.
Policy on Control
of Armaments

Dated December 10,
1954

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Plane Dec PB Mfg

¶ 4. Technical and scientific examination of plants could, however, be supplemented by analysis of other types of information which have already been utilized to the extent available in the preparation of intelligence estimates of the Soviet atomic program.

~~If the age~~ Provided the plan permitted ~~further~~ adequate access to such auxiliary information, verification of past ^{Soviet} production would be greatly facilitated. Of particular value would be records ~~including~~ covering uranium mining, reduction and transport, process chemicals, power consumption, and ~~fixed~~ and payrolls, etc. In addition, access to records of the supporting economy would provide additional check points.

This is obviously necessary at some time. My view is, however,
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01441R000100060003-5 Discrepancy
discussions; so if the ABC paper is modified in a general way along
the lines indicated on the second typed page, we and State can
live with it. i.e. all we want to avoid is revision of estimate ab initio on
account of statements that verification cannot wash a all.

1. What is required of current intelligence estimates as

to plutonium + U-235 production in USSR?

To what extent?

2. Are the ^{intelligence} sources of these estimates such that they
(at a future time)
could be used for indicating falsity of Soviet declarations?

~~etc.~~ ~~etc.~~ This involves two things:

security ~~etc.~~ considerations + the likelihood that
these types of information would continue to be available.

3. What additional sources for estimates would become
(or could be suggested for inclusion in the plan) available for.
 - a. Direct estimate at facilities
 - b. Collateral estimate through general economy
etc.?

4. How much would the methods in 3 refine the
accuracy of the estimates?

5. What resultant range in terms of most effective
using percentage of error conceivable weapon concerning [] set against present estimates

From: 9 Dec PB May



Roughly speaking, 6 kg = 1 cut

2.3 cuts + boosting material can
make 1 multi megaton bomb.

Ergo whether your margin of error
is a few score or a few hundred kg
the result is going to be massive

- Maybe - but suppose a t6 takes \times tons
if one etc etc -